Tax Burden and the Mismeasurement of State Tax Policy by Reed, W.R. & Rogers, C.L.
  
 
TAX BURDEN AND THE MISMEASUREMENT  
OF STATE TAX POLICY 
 
W. Robert Reed and Cynthia L. Rogers∗* 
University of Oklahoma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revised December 21, 2005 
 
 
Contact information:  W. Robert Reed, Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma, 
Norman, OK, 73019.  Email: breed@ou.edu.  (405) 325-2358 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Tax Burden, defined as the ratio of total tax revenues over personal income, is frequently used to 
measure state tax policy. We analyze the empirical relationship between changes in Tax Burden 
and changes in tax policies from 1987 to 2000 using states’ forecasts of revenue impacts of new 
tax legislation.  Our two major findings have important implications.  First, we demonstrate that 
income-induced, non-tax policy changes are a significant determinant of changes in Tax Burden.  
These income effects are likely to cause misinterpretation when Tax Burden is used as a variable 
in economic growth regressions.  Second, we estimate that approximately half of the total 
variation in Tax Burden is due to changes in non-tax policy factors.  This finding quantifies the 
extent of the “mismeasurement” problem which has been discussed, but not analyzed, in 
previous literature.  In concluding, we promote the use of alternative approaches for estimating 
the economic effects of taxes.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Conclusive evidence concerning the empirical relationship between state tax policy and 
economic growth continues to be elusive in the academic literature.  Typically the relationship is 
analyzed by regressing an outcome measure of interest (such as per capita personal income) on a 
tax policy variable.  The resulting coefficient estimate is commonly used to advise policy makers 
regarding the impact of tax policy proposals.  The validity of this interpretation depends crucially 
on the accuracy with which the tax policy variable is measured.   
Unfortunately, the complexity of state and local tax schemes makes it difficult to find 
good measures of tax policy (e.g., Gold 1996).  These are difficult to construct from statutory tax 
parameters due to substantial variation in “state tax base definitions, rate structures and 
enforcement practices (Helms 1985, p. 577).”  As a result, most of the state and local economic 
development literature measures tax rates with the variable “Tax Burden,” defined as the ratio of 
state and local tax revenues to personal income (cf. Wasylenko 1997, p. 42).1  
The literature widely acknowledges that Tax Burden may be an imprecise measure of tax 
policy (Waslenko 1997; Gold 1996; Canto and Webb 1987; Helms, 1985).  The problem is so 
widely recognized, that research often omits discussions of the potential imprecision associated 
with using Tax Burden as a proxy for tax policy (e.g., Tomljanovich, 2004; Yamarik, 2000).  
Empirical studies of growth continue to employ Tax Burden as a proxy for state tax policy 
because of its ease of availability and the lack of better alternatives.2  This is regrettable, because 
it can lead to the misinterpretation of empirical results, and bad policy advice.   
For example, if movements in Tax Burden are driven by non-tax policy factors, and these 
factors are correlated with the outcome measure, then the resulting coefficient estimates cannot 
be taken as descriptive of what would happen if policy makers altered tax policy.  Theory 
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suggests that this scenario is quite plausible:  If state tax systems are non-proportional, then 
changes in state income will induce changes in Tax Burden.  If the dependent variable is also 
income-related, then an empirical relationship will be generated between Tax Burden and the 
dependent variable that has nothing to do with tax policy.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate how well Tax Burden measures state tax 
policy.  We make several contributions.  First, we empirically quantify the relationship between 
changes in Tax Burden and changes in state tax policy.  Following Poterba (1994), Poterba and 
Rueben (2001), Merriman (2001), and Maag and Merriman (2003), we use state-generated 
forecasts of revenue impacts associated with new tax legislation as direct measures of state tax 
policy.  These serve as a proxy for changes in tax revenues due to changes in tax policy, holding 
constant the influence of other variables (like income).   
We further contribute to the literature by evaluating sources of divergence between Tax 
Burden and state tax policy.  To do so, we decompose changes in Tax Burden into three mutually 
exclusive components: (1) changes in state tax policy; (2) income-induced changes which are 
independent of tax policy; and (3) changes caused by other factors which are independent of 
state tax policy.  We demonstrate the statistical significance of income-induced changes in 
explaining changes in the Tax Burden variable.   
Finally, we use our theory-driven empirical results to estimate the percent of variation in 
the Tax Burden variable that is due to non-tax policy factors.  Our preferred estimates indicate 
that approximately half of the variance in the change of Tax Burden is due to factors other than 
state tax policy. 
Our results are important for researchers and policy-makers interested in the effect of tax 
policy on economic growth.  By empirically identifying the substantial imprecision associated 
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with using Tax Burden as a proxy for state tax policy, we highlight the need for better measures.  
We conclude the paper with suggestions for future research. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 identifies two data series that, we argue, 
provide objective and reliable measures of state tax policy.  Using these data series as our 
benchmarks, Section 3 presents qualitative evidence that Tax Burden mismeasures state tax 
policy.  Section 4 derives a theoretical model relating the Tax Burden variable to state tax policy 
and other factors.  Section 5 presents the results of estimating this model, along with estimates of 
the degree to which changes in the Tax Burden variable are driven by non-tax policy factors.  
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. DIRECT MEASURES OF STATE TAX POLICY 
In order to determine whether Tax Burden is a reliable measure of state tax policy, we need to 
track and quantify changes in state tax policy.  Total tax revenues will not work, since these go 
up and down with the business cycle, even when tax policy doesn’t change.  The tax policy 
measure needs to be independent of fluctuations in state income.  Our approach employs the 
actual revenue forecasts used by states to assess the consequences of new tax legislation. 
 State laws generally require states to estimate the budgetary impacts of tax and spending 
legislation.  This information is collected by two national organizations -- the National 
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL).  NASBO is an independent professional organization for the chief 
financial advisors to governors, including heads of state budget offices, state finance departments 
and their staffs.  NCSL is a bipartisan organization that serves state legislatures and represents 
their interest to federal policy makers.  Both organizations began conducting annual surveys of 
their membership regarding state tax policy in 1987.   
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 NASBO, in conjunction with the National Governors’ Association, collects its 
information from state budget officers.3  Among other things, respondents provide estimates of 
changes in the next fiscal year’s tax revenues resulting from changes in tax legislation.  NCSL 
surveys state legislative staff.4  Historically, the NCSL has used two methods to report tax 
change impacts.  The baseline method (NCSL-B), available as an annual time series from 1987 
to 1997, tracks tax legislation changes adopted in a given year in terms of the impact on the 
following fiscal year.  It was discontinued in favor of the taxpayer liability method (NCSL-TL), 
which was initiated in 1995.  The NCSL-TL series provides estimates of changes in the taxes 
actually paid by taxpayers.5   
 In addition to definitional variations on the nature and timing of tax changes, the NASBO 
and NCSL surveys also differ with respect to when information is collected.  Thus, revisions in 
revenue forecasts may be picked up by one survey and not by another.  FIGURE 1 compares the 
NASBO and NCSL-collected, state revenue forecasts associated with tax policy changes.  Fiscal 
year represents the year that the tax changes are legislated to take effect.  Despite some 
differences, the overall impression is that the different series present similar pictures of predicted 
revenue changes resulting from changes in states’ tax policies.6  The sample correlation between 
the two series is 0.777, and is highly significant.  When these series are converted to measures of 
tax policy as discussed in the next section, their correlation rises to 0.822.  In contrast, pairwise 
correlations between each of these measures and the Tax Burden variable are substantially lower 
at 0.384 (NASBO) and 0.398 (NCSL).7 
We take as our point of departure that the state revenue forecasts collected by NASBO 
and NCSL represent unbiased estimates of the revenue impacts of changes in state tax policy.  
Corroborating support for employing this assumption comes from three sources: (i) previous 
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research on strategic bias in state revenue forecasts, (ii) personal conversations with professional 
staff at NASBO, NCSL, and state budgetary offices, and (iii) the use of these series in recent 
studies.   
 While no studies directly evaluate the accuracy of state revenue forecasts associated with 
tax legislation, some studies have investigated state forecasts of total tax revenues—a related 
subject.8  No conclusive evidence of bias has been found.9  However, even if states strategically 
bias total revenue forecasts, it does not follow that this bias would extend to revenue forecasts of 
specific tax legislation.  These latter forecasts are likely to be more closely scrutinized than 
overall budget forecasts since they are inputs in the legislative process and impact specific 
economic groups.  As such, they need to be credible to many different constituencies.10  Personal 
conversations with current and former professionals from NASBO, NCSL, and several state 
budgetary offices provided anecdotal confirmation that the survey responses supplied by the 
states are untainted by strategic bias.  
 Finally, we note that several recent studies have employed the NASBO and NCSL-
collected revenue forecasts as direct measures of state tax policy.  Poterba (1994) and Poterba 
and Rueben (2001) use NASBO data to represent state fiscal policy in their studies of how states 
respond to unexpected revenue shocks.  Merriman (2001) uses both series in his analysis 
predicting changes in tax legislation.  Maag and Merriman (2003) use NASBO-related estimates 
to investigate tax policy responses to the 1990 and 2001 recessions.   
 
3. QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE THAT TAX BURDEN MISMEASURES STATE TAX 
POLICY 
 
In the analysis that follows, we define the variable Tax Burden as the ratio of state (but not local) 
tax revenues (R) over Personal Income (Y),  
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 Tax Burdenst = Rst /Ys,t-1.        (1) 
We exclude local tax revenues in order to be consistent with the NASBO and NCSL-collected 
estimates.  We take the relationship between this restricted version of Tax Burden and state tax 
policy as an indication of the relationship between that of the more broadly defined Tax Burden 
variable and state and local tax policy.  Note that tax revenues are reported by fiscal year, while 
state Personal Income is measured over the calendar year.  Following convention, Personal 
Income is from the calendar year that spans the beginning of the fiscal year.11   
FIGURE 2 compares the Tax Burden time series with the NASBO and NCSL-B time 
series for the state of Iowa for fiscal years 1988-2001.12  For the most part, Iowa’s Tax Burden 
series behaves in the manner expected of a reliable measure of state tax policy: it rises during 
years in which tax legislation was projected to increase state revenues, declines during years in 
which tax legislation was projected to decrease state revenues, and stays the same when no 
change in revenues was expected.   
A careful examination of the Tax Burden series for all the states, however, reveals that 
Iowa’s experience is the exception, not the rule.  FIGURES 3 and 4 illustrate two typical 
scenarios in which Tax Burden mismeasures state tax policy.  In FIGURE 3, large projected 
increases in Louisiana’s taxes in 1989 had little effect on the state’s Tax Burden.  Furthermore, 
during the early 1990’s, legislated tax increases corresponded with a general decline in the Tax 
Burden series.  In contrast, the example in FIGURE 4 shows large movements in Michigan’s Tax 
Burden from 1988 through 1994 despite the fact that tax policy was forecasted to have a 
negligible impact on tax receipts.  Cases like Louisiana where significant changes in state tax 
policy correspond with little, or even perverse, movement in Tax Burden; and Michigan, where 
large movements in Tax Burden are not generated by changes in tax legislation, are common.  In 
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fact, the motivation for this study came from an (unsuccessful) attempt in previous research to 
identify significant tax legislation from movements in states’ Tax Burden time series.13 
FIGURE 5 aggregates data from all the states to present an overall picture of how well 
changes in Tax Burden correspond to changes in state tax policy.14  According to both the 
NASBO and NCSL-B measures, states legislated increases in tax revenues on net every year 
between 1988 and 1994.  Yet, the value of Tax Burden in 1994 was about the same as it was in 
1988.  States legislated lower taxes on net every year from 1996 to 2001.  However, except for 
fiscal year 2001, there is little evidence of these tax cuts in the corresponding Tax Burden series.  
Clearly, Tax Burden does not track changes in state tax policies.   
 
4.  THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX BURDEN 
AND STATE TAX POLICY 
 
4.1.  THE DECOMPOSITION OF TAX BURDEN 
This section models the relationship between Tax Burden and state tax policy in order to clarify 
how these are empirically linked.  Following the literature, the relationship between a state’s tax 
revenues (R) and its income (Y) is approximated with a linear revenue function15:  
R
st1-ts,st,1st0st YR εββ ++= , ,        (2) 
where Rstε  is a mean-zero error term assumed to be uncorrelated with state income.  Thus, tax 
policy for state s at time t can be characterized by the pair ( )st1,st0, ,ββ , where st1,β  is the state’s 
effective marginal tax rate on income at time t.   
 A “true” measure of the revenue change caused by a change in state tax policy 
parameters ( )st1,st0, ,ββ  in fiscal year t, which shows up in fiscal year t+1 revenues, should hold 
income constant.  This can be specified as follows,  
 1tsst1st0Yst
True
st YTaxesTaxes −⋅+== ,,,| ββ ΔΔΔΔ ,      (3) 
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where st0,βΔ  is the component of tax changes that does not change with a state’s income, and 
( )1-ts,st Y⋅,1βΔ  is the component of tax changes that are affected by a state’s income.   
 Let us consider measuring the change in state tax policy by the change in Tax Burden,  
 
1-ts,
st
st
1ts,
st1ts,st Y
R
Y
R
Burden TaxBurden TaxTaxBurden −=−= ++Δ .   (4) 
Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (4), the relationship can be expressed as, 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ++
1-ts,
R
st
st
R
1ts,
1-ts,
st0
st
1st0
st1st YYYY
 TaxBurden  εεβββ ,,,ΔΔ .    (5) 
Equation (5) makes clear that changes in state income ( 1tsts YY −,, , ) cause changes in Tax Burden 
even when there is no corresponding change in state tax policy parameters 
( )0st1,1st0,st0, == + βββ Δ, .16  As we shall subsequently demonstrate, this is not the only problem 
associated with using Tax Burden to measure the impact of changes in tax policy.  
 Substituting Equation (3) into (5) yields the following: 
 st
st1-ts,
st1-ts,
1st0
1ts
True
st
st YY
YY
Y
TaxesTaxBurden ηβ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= +
−
,
,
ΔΔ ,    (6) 
where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= +
1-ts,
R
st
st
R
1ts,
st YY
εεη , ( ) 0E st =η , and stη  is heteroscedastic and autocorrelated.  Note that 
the coefficient on 
1ts
True
st
Y
Taxes
−,
Δ
, the variable measuring the true change in state tax policy, is one. 
 Equation (6) decomposes the change in Tax Burden into three components.  The first 
term is the change in Tax Burden due to the change in state tax policy.  The second term 
represents the change in Tax Burden due to changes in income.  The third term is composed of 
miscellaneous factors that are unrelated to state tax policy.  The latter two terms cause Tax 
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Burden to mismeasure state tax policy.  Estimation of Equation (6) would provide an indication 
of the extent of this measurement error.  Unfortunately the policy variable TruestTaxesΔ  is 
unobserved.   
 In the remainder of this section, we devise a strategy for overcoming this problem, 
allowing us to estimate the components of the Tax Burden variable as a function of observable 
variables.  Our key insight consists of identifying the relationship between TruestTaxesΔ  and the 
state revenue forecasts collected by NASBO and NCSL.  A complication that we need to address 
is that these latter revenue forecasts incorporate changes in income, whereas TruestTaxesΔ  consists 
of income-constant revenue changes. 
 
4.2.  A CONSISTENT ESTIMATOR OF TAX POLICY BASED ON STATE REVENUE 
FORECASTS 
 
Let the variable ForecaststTaxesΔ  represent the NASBO/NCSL-collected forecasts of the revenue 
change at time t+1 attributed to a tax policy change at time t.  In the context of the model above,  
 ( )FstststForecastst YTaxes ⋅+= ,1,0 ββ ΔΔΔ ,      (7) 
where st0,βΔ  is the component of tax changes that does not change with a state’s income17, FstY  
is the forecasted value of state income for the next year, and ( )Fstst1 Y⋅,βΔ  is the component of tax 
changes that are affected by a state’s income.18   
 We need to make two assumptions in order to express TruestTaxesΔ  as a function of 
observables.  First, we assume that 0st0 =,βΔ .  In this case, it follows from Equations (3) and (7) 
that 
 F
st
Forecast
st
1ts
True
st
Y
Taxes
Y
Taxes ΔΔ =
−,
.       (8) 
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 Note that previous studies estimating marginal tax rates assume both (i) 0st0 =,βΔ  and 
(ii) 0st1 =,βΔ ; i.e., they assume a linear revenue function that does not vary over time (e.g., 
Koester and Kormendi, 1989; Becsi, 1996).  In comparison, our approach is less restrictive.  
However, there is an additional reason to support the assumption that 0st0 =,βΔ :  As a practical 
matter, the effect of this assumption is small.  The Appendix demonstrates that under reasonable 
assumptions, the error associated with measuring TruestTaxesΔ  using states’ forecasts of tax policy 
changes when 0st0 ≠,βΔ  will generally be less than 5%. 
 The second assumption we make is that the relationship between the realized and 
forecasted values of state income is given by 
 ( ) FstFstst Y ε1Y += ,        (9) 
where Fstε  represents the percentage difference between the income forecast developed by state 
budgeters and the realized value of state income, and ( ) 0εE Fst = .19 
 Substituting Equation (9) into Equation (8) produces the following relationship,  
 st
1ts
True
st
st
Forecast
st
Y
Taxes
Y
Taxes υ+=
−,
ΔΔ
,      (10) 
where Fst
st
Forecast
st
st εY
Taxes ⋅−= Δυ , stυ  is heteroscedastic, and 0Tplim
T
1t
st
T
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∑
=∞→
υ .  Thus, the ratio of 
the observed variables ForecaststTaxesΔ  and Yst is a consistent estimate of the change in state tax 
policy in the sense that ∑
=
T
1t st
Forecast
st T
Y
TaxesΔ  is arbitrarily close to ∑
= −
T
1t 1ts
True
st T
Y
Taxes
,
Δ  for 
sufficiently large T.20   
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Having shown that the observed variable 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 is a consistent estimator of the 
unobserved variable 
1ts
True
st
Y
Taxes
−,
Δ
, we can use the former as a proxy in Equation (6), yielding the 
following estimable regression equation,  
 st
st1-ts,
st1-ts,
s2
st
Forecast
st
10st YY
YY
Y
TaxesBurden ΔTax ωααα +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⋅+= ,Δ ,   (11) 
where s,2α  is a state-specific coefficient estimating s,0β .21  The estimation is at best suggestive, 
since 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 measures 
1ts
True
st
Y
Taxes
−,
Δ
 with error (cf. Equation [10]). 
5.  ESTIMATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TAX BURDEN VARIABLE 
AND STATE TAX POLICY 
 
5.1.   ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (11) 
Columns (1) and (2) of TABLE 1 report the results of estimating Equation (11) using the 
NASBO- and NCSL-collected state revenue forecasts, respectively.  The NASBO data consist of 
658 annual observations of 47 states over the years 1987-2000.22  The NCSL data consist of 517 
observations of the same 47 states over the years 1987-1997.  Coefficients are estimated using 
OLS with robust standard errors.  We use the “White period robust coefficient variance 
estimator” (Quantitative Micro Software 2004, page 854) to accommodate both arbitrary serial 
correlation and time-varying variances in the error terms.  This is appropriate given the error 
structure defined by Equation (6) above. 
 The first explanatory variable in the NASBO-1 and NCSL-1 specifications is 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ
, which was demonstrated to be a consistent estimator of state tax policy in 
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Section IV.  Both the NASBO and NCSL specifications find that 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ
 is positively 
and significantly associated with Burden ΔTax .  The t-values are quite high: 10.00 and 8.77, 
respectively.  This result is consistent with Equation (11) and provides evidence that 
Burden ΔTax  captures, at least in part, the effects of actual state tax policy.   
 While it is true that both of the estimated coefficients are less than one (0.5872 and 
0.5578, respectively), this is not unexpected if 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 measures state tax policy with 
error, which it certainly does.  Recall that the NASBO and NCSL revenue forecasts, which are 
designed to measure the same thing, are imperfectly correlated (the sample correlation of the two 
series is 0.777).  This is testimony to the difficulty of accurately measuring the revenue impacts 
of tax legislation.  Nevertheless, the empirical results using these two different measures are 
quite similar, and continue to be so in subsequent specifications reported below.   
 While Equation (11) predicts that Burden ΔTax  will pick up changes in state tax policy, 
it also predicts that it will reflect the influences of other factors.  Of particular interest are the 47 
state-specific interaction terms (corresponding to the terms ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
st1-ts,
st1-ts,
s2 YY
YY
,α  in Equation [11]).  
These terms reflect the influence that changes in state income – which are not associated with 
state tax policy -- exert on Burden ΔTax .  The empirical question is:  Are these non-policy 
related factors significant determinants of Burden ΔTax ?   
 Although we do not report the 47 individual coefficient estimates ( s2,αˆ ’s) due to space 
constraints, approximately three-fourths of these terms are individually significant at the 5% 
level.  We test the hypothesis that these 47 coefficients are jointly equal to zero.   This 
corresponds to a test that Tax Burden is unaffected by non-tax policy related movements in state 
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income.  The results are reported at the bottom of Columns (1) and (2).  The hypothesis is 
soundly rejected in both specifications, with p-values well below 0.1 percent (cf. “Hypothesis 
Test: State-Specific Interaction Terms”).  These results provide empirical evidence that changes 
in state income induce significant movement in the Tax Burden variable, causing the Tax Burden 
variable to change even when there has been no change in state in tax policy. 
 The results of Columns (1) and (2) also provide suggestive evidence of the influence of 
other, non-tax policy related factors.  Recall that the error term in Equation (11), stω , represents 
all other factors that can cause Tax Burden to mismeasure tax policy.  The more important these 
factors, the larger the error term, and the lower the R2 of the equation.  In fact, both specifications 
are characterized by low R2 values: 0.209 and 0.273, respectively.  Of course, this is only 
suggestive since other factors, such as using an imperfect measure for 
1ts
True
st
Y
Taxes
−,
Δ
, would also 
depress R2. 
 Although the theory of Equation (11) specifies the change in income terms to be 
interacted with state-specific dummy variables to obtain the terms, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
st1-ts,
st1-ts,
s2 YY
YY
,α , s = 
1,2,…,47; this specification is admittedly unorthodox.  It raises concerns that the significance of 
these terms may be spurious, reflecting the influence of (omitted) state fixed effects.  To address 
this concern, each of the equations in Columns (1) and (2) were respecified.  The ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
st1-ts,
st1-ts,
YY
YY
 
term was included without interactions and, instead, state fixed effects were added separately.  
The results are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of TABLE 1 as specifications NASBO-2 and 
NCSL-2. 
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 As a means of comparing these (non-nested) specifications, we employ two model 
selection criteria.  The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC).  Lower criterion values represent “better” models.  Both the AIC and SIC 
criteria select the specifications of (1) and (2) over those of (3) and (4), respectively.  In other 
words, the “unorthodox” specifications that arise from the theory are preferred to the more usual, 
fixed effects specification.  This provides corroborating evidence in favor of the theory.   
 We perform one additional robustness check:  FIGURE 5 suggests that Tax Burden is 
characterized by cyclical behavior.  Accordingly, we add time fixed effects to the specifications 
of Columns (1) – (4) and repeat our analysis.  The results are reported in Columns (5) – (8) of 
TABLE 1.23 
There is some difference of opinion between the AIC and the SIC whether the addition of 
time fixed effects improves the specifications.  The AIC always concludes that time fixed effects 
improve the specification.  In contrast, the SIC finds that only the NASBO specifications are 
improved by the addition of time fixed effects.  As a practical matter, however, our main results 
are unaffected:  (i) the estimated coefficient on the 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ
 variable is approximately 
equal to 0.6 across all specifications; (ii) the hypothesis that the state-specific interaction terms 
have coefficients equal to zero is always soundly rejected; and (iii) the theory-driven 
specifications are always preferred to the adhoc, state-fixed effects specifications.  
 
5.2.  THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-TAX POLICY FACTORS AS DETERMINANTS OF 
THE TAX BURDEN VARIABLE 
 
The preceding analysis finds statistically significant relationships between the Tax Burden 
variable and both (i) tax policy and (ii) non-tax policy variables.  However, from a 
mismeasurement perspective, we really would like to know how much of the movement in Tax 
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Burden is due to factors other than state tax policy.  This section takes three approaches to 
answering this question. 
 The first approach estimates a simple regression model with Burden ΔTax  as the 
dependent variable and 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ  as the single explanatory variable.  The R2 from this 
equation provides an estimate of how much of the variance of Burden ΔTax  is due to state tax 
policy.  It follows that 2R1−  provides an estimate of how much of the variance is due to non-tax 
policy factors.  The results from this analysis are reported in Row (1) of TABLE 2.  
Approximately 87.1% of the variance of Burden ΔTax  cannot be “explained” by the NASBO-
measured tax policy variable, 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ , and can correspondingly be attributed to non-tax 
policy factors.  The corresponding value is 84.1% when we use the NCSL-measure of state tax 
policy. 
 One problem with this simple approach is that the estimate of the effect of tax policy may 
be biased by the omission of other variables from the regression equation.  Our second approach 
addresses this problem by employing the NASBO-3 and NCSL-3 specifications from TABLE 1, 
which include a large number of control variables.  In order to isolate the effect of tax policy, we 
use the estimated coefficients from these specifications, fix the other variables in the equation at 
their sample means, and then obtain predicted values for Burden ΔTax .  The variance in these 
predicted Burden ΔTax  values allows us to compute the percent of the total variance in 
Burden ΔTax  that can be attributed to changes in state tax policy.  It follows that the remaining 
variance becomes an estimate of the amount of variation in Burden ΔTax  that can be attributed 
to non-tax policy factors.  The results from this analysis are reported in Row (2) of TABLE 2.  
Based on the NASBO estimates of state tax policy, this approach leads to an estimate that 84.1% 
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of the variance in Burden ΔTax  is due to non-tax policy factors.  The corresponding value using 
the NCSL estimates is 81.8%. 
 One can also find fault with this second approach.  Measurement error in the NASBO and 
NCSL estimates is expected to cause the estimated coefficient of 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ  to be biased 
towards zero.  This would dampen the predicted effect of tax policy on Burden ΔTax , and lead 
to an underestimation of the portion of Burden ΔTax  attributable to state tax policy.  We address 
this problem by imposing the restriction from Equation (6) that the coefficient on the tax policy 
variable should equal one.  Restricted OLS estimation of the NASBO-3 and NCSL-3 models 
produces consistent estimates of the other coefficients in the equation, subject to the restriction 
being true.  These coefficient estimates are then used to generate predicted values of 
Burden ΔTax , again fixing the other variables in the equation at their mean levels.   
 Forcing the coefficient on 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ  to equal one serves to greatly increase the 
amount of variation in Burden ΔTax  “explained” by state tax policy.  Correspondingly, this 
decreases the amount “explained” by non-tax policy factors.  Row (3) of TABLE 2 gives 
estimates of the latter.  Using this third approach, we find that non-tax policy factors “explain” 
56.8% of the variance of Burden ΔTax  using the NASBO data, and 44.9% of the variance of 
Burden ΔTax  using the NCSL data. 
 If we take the calculations from this third approach as our preferred estimates, we are still 
left with the conclusion that a large portion of the movement in the Tax Burden variable, roughly 
half of its variance, is due to factors that are unrelated to state tax policy.  This is consistent with 
the qualitative evidence presented in FIGURES 1 through 5 above. 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates whether the variable Tax Burden, widely used in empirical studies of 
taxes and economic growth, reliably measures state tax policy.  We have some good news:  Our 
findings indicate that changes in Tax Burden are positively and significantly related to changes in 
state tax policy.  Unfortunately, we also find evidence of substantial measurement error.   
 We decompose Tax Burden changes into three components:  (1) changes in state tax 
policy, (2) income-induced changes in revenue that do not measure state tax policy, and (3) other 
factors that do not measure state tax policy.  The latter two categories constitute measurement 
error with respect to measuring state tax policy.  Our empirical analysis establishes the 
quantitative and statistical importance of the second component.  In other words, we demonstrate 
that changes in state income cause the Tax Burden variable to change even when there has been 
no change in policy.  This is of particular concern because many studies that attempt to measure 
the impact of taxes use an income-based dependent variable.  Income-generated movement in the 
Tax Burden variable will induce a correlation between Tax Burden and the dependent variable 
that is unrelated to state tax policy. 
 Lastly, our theoretical framework allows us to estimate the importance of non-tax policy 
factors as determinants of changes in Tax Burden.  Our preferred estimates indicate that 
approximately half of the variance in changes in Tax Burden is due to non-tax policy factors.  
This constitutes a serious concern for those who rely on Tax Burden to provide an accurate 
measure of state tax policy. 
  Our findings should be of particular interest to researchers and policy-makers interested 
in measuring the effects of state tax policy.  On a positive note, this study demonstrates how state 
revenue forecasts can be used to construct consistent measures of state tax policy.  We believe 
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that researchers will find these forecast data increasingly attractive as the respective time series 
lengthen over time.   
In the meantime, instrumental variables remain a potentially fruitful way to address 
measurement error bias in Tax Burden.  Statutory tax parameters (e.g., property and sales tax 
rates, including information on the tax base; income tax rate parameters, including bracket and 
tax credit data) are obvious candidates for instruments.  In addition, researchers may find it 
useful to pursue alternative methodologies for measuring and estimating tax effects.  
Representative agent models (e.g. Fisher and Peters 1998) and new, quasi-experimental methods 
(e.g., Reed and Rogers 2003; Reed and Rogers 2004) are promising avenues for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
A CALCULATION OF THE ERROR ASSOCIATED WITH MEASURING
1, −ts
True
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 
WITH F
st
Forecast
st
Y
TaxesΔ  WHEN 0st0 ≠,βΔ  
 
We define the error associated with measuring 
1, −ts
True
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 with F
st
Forecast
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 when 0st0 ≠,βΔ  
by 
 
1,
1,
−
−
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
ts
True
st
ts
True
st
F
st
Forecast
st
Y
Taxes
Y
Taxes
Y
Taxes
Error
Δ
ΔΔ
.      (12) 
Substituting Equations (3) and (7) into (12) yields 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+
=
1-ts,
1-ts,st1st0
1-ts,
1-ts,st1st0
F
st
F
stst1st0
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Error
,,
,,,,
ββ
ββββ
ΔΔ
ΔΔΔΔ
.    (13) 
 Algebraic manipulation allows us to rewrite (13) as follows, 
 ( )1-ts,st1st0
st0F
st
F
st
st0
Y
Y
Y
Error ⋅+
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
,,
,,
ββ
ββ
ΔΔ
ΔΔ
.       (14) 
Note that when 0st0 =,βΔ , 0Error = . 
 Define stk  such that 
 ( )1-ts,st1stst0 Yk ,, ββ ΔΔ ⋅= .        (15) 
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Thus, if  1kst = , the component of total new taxes that is independent of state income, st0,βΔ , is 
equal to the component of total new taxes that is dependent on the value of state income, 
( )1-ts,st1 Y,βΔ .24  Substituting (15) into (14) and doing some manipulation yields,  
 
st
F
st
1-ts,
st
k1
Y
Y
1k
Error +
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
= .        (16) 
 We now define a new variable, stg , such that 
 ( ) 1tsstFst Yg1Y −⋅+= , .         (17) 
Thus, stg  is the forecasted annual growth rate of Personal Income.  Substituting (17) into (16) 
and performing some algebraic manipulation yields 
 
st
st
st
st
k1
g1
gk
Error +
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−= .        (18) 
 We are now in a position to estimate the size of the error.  The annual growth rate of 
(nominal) state Personal Income from 1970-2000 is approximately 6 percent.  Further, it is 
unlikely that the changes in total taxes that were independent of income would ever be as large 
as the portion that is dependent on income.  Accordingly, if we substitute “upper bound” values 
of 100gst .=  and 1kst = , we get %5.4045.0 −=−=Error .  This constitutes the basis for our 
claim in the text that “the error associated with measuring 
1ts
True
st
Y
Taxes
−,
Δ
 by F
st
Forecast
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 when 
0st0 ≠,βΔ  will generally be less than 5 percent.” 
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∗ An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the University of Oklahoma and at the 2003 National Tax 
Association meetings.  We thank the participants at both presentations for their helpful comments. We also are 
indebted to Kevin Grier, David Merriman, Dan Sutter, and Steve Yamarik for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 Alternative names for this variable include average tax burden, average state tax rate, effective average state tax 
rate, and tax share. 
2 Helms (1985) argues that the use of tax burden to measure tax policy presents less severe problems compared with 
other feasible measures (p. 577).   
3 NASBO estimates are reported in a series entitled The Fiscal Survey of the States (1987-2002).  The latest 
estimates are available online at www.nasbo.org. 
4 NCSL estimates are published in State Budget Actions (1987-1989), State Budget and Tax Actions (1990-1991) 
and State Tax Actions (1992-2002). 
5 For example, in the tax liability method, multi-year tax changes are credited to the fiscal year when the change is 
scheduled to take effect.  Thus, if tax increases are phased in over a three-year period, the tax liability method shows 
three years of increases, whereas the baseline method only shows changes in the first year.  Further, if the legislature 
decides to extend a tax increase that was previously scheduled to expire, or to postpone a tax decrease that was 
previously scheduled to take effect, the tax liability method shows no change in taxes, while the baseline measure 
would show an increase.  See State Tax Actions 1996 for a comparison of the treatment of tax changes under both 
methods.  
6 See Merriman (2000) for further discussions of the NASBO and NCSL estimates. 
7  The Tax Burden variable used for these correlations is defined below.  It is based solely on state revenues to make 
it comparable to the state-level revenue forecasts collected by NASBO and NCSL. 
8 Various hypotheses address why policymakers might want to either over- or under-state expected revenues (Klay 
1983; Rodgers and Joyce 1996).  These include partisan politics and aversion to revenue shortfalls.  In contrast, 
other researchers argue that the overriding concern of the revenue forecast process is to minimize the costs 
associated with inaccurate forecasts (Mocan and Azad 1996; Shkurti and Winefordner 1989; Bretschneider et al. 
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1989).  Budget shortfalls cause cuts in program spending while surpluses can be seen as evidence of excessive tax 
rates or the underfunding of public goods (Feenberg et al. 1989).    
9 Building on Cassidy et al. (1989), Bretschneider and Gorr (1992) find that a complicated mix of partisan politics 
and fiscal stress factors drive forecast errors in sales tax revenues.  In contrast, Mocan and Azad (1995) find no 
systematic bias in general fund revenues and little evidence of political and institutional influences as a whole.  This 
is perhaps the most econometrically rigorous analysis of state revenue forecast errors.  It uses a rich set of forecast 
variables, including the source of state and federal economic trend forecasts for 20 states from 1986-92, to estimate 
a cross section, times series model with random effects.   
10 Corroborating this interpretation are the similarities in the NASBO and NCSL estimates (cf. FIGURE I), despite 
originating from organizations facing different political pressures.   
11 For example Tax Burden for 1996 would have tax revenues corresponding to Fiscal Year 1996 (which typically 
runs from July 1, 1995 through June 30, 1996) divided by Personal Income for calendar year 1995. 
12 The NCSL-TL series is omitted because it is available for only a small number of years.  However, as discussed 
above, it bears close resemblance to the NASBO series.  The series only extend to 2001 because this is the most 
recent year for which Tax Burden could be calculated. 
13 Figures representing Tax Burden time series for each state may be accessed via the internet at: “http://faculty-
staff.ou.edu/R/Cynthia.Rogers-1/TAX/TAXBURDEN.htm”. 
14 In FIGURE 5, Tax Burden for the U.S. is calculated as the ratio of the sum of state tax revenues for the U.S. over 
national Personal Income.   
15  See for example Koester and Kormendi (1989) and Mullen and Williams (1994). 
16  If state tax policy stays constant, then Equation (5) becomes ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= +
1-ts,
R
st
st
R
1ts,
st1-ts,
st
st0st YYYY
Y TaxBurden  εεβ ΔΔ , .  
Accordingly, if a state’s tax structure is regressive ( 0st0 >,β ), then an increase in income will cause a decrease in 
that state’s Tax Burden. 
17 Note that the NASBO/NCSL-collected forecasts consist solely of taxes, excluding fees. 
18 ForecaststTaxesΔ  is the same variable that Poterba (1994) calls “ stTAXNEXTΔ .”  
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19 Note that the “next” year is Yst, since the budget forecast is made at the beginning of fiscal year t, which begins in 
the calendar year corresponding to Ys,t-1 . 
20 Although 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TaxesΔ
 and stTaxBurdenΔ  both suffer from measurement error, the nature of the errors are 
different.  The measurement error in the former stems from errors in forecasting next year’s state income ( Fstε ).  In 
contrast, the measurement error in stTaxBurdenΔ  is due to changes in income as well as miscellaneous factors that 
are unrelated to state tax policy.  These measurement errors have different consequences to the extent that these 
other sources of measurement error matter.  
21  The reader may note that the error term in Equation (11) includes the components 
st
R
1ts,
Y
+ε  and 
1-ts,
R
st
Y
ε , where stY  
and 1-ts,Y  also appear as explanatory variables in the second term.  However, recall that 0E
R
st =)(ε and is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with the income variable. 
22 Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming were omitted; the latter because its Tax Burden values, like Alaska’s, have been 
greatly impacted by fluctuations in oil prices and production. 
23 We also estimated specifications that added both state and time fixed effects to the NASBO-1 and NCSL-1 models, 
but these were strictly dominated by the specifications with just time fixed effects. 
24  Strictly speaking this should read, “the component of total new taxes that is dependent on the value of state 
income assuming state income stays constant.” 
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TABLE 1 
Estimating the Determinants of Changes in the Tax Burden Variable 
Specificationa  NASBO-1 
(1) 
NCSL-1 
(2) 
NASBO-2 
(3) 
NCSL-2 
(4) 
Constant 0.0014 (5.82) 
0.0015 
(5.23) 
-0.0001 
(1.79) 
-0.0001 
(0.97) 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ  0.5872 
(10.00) 
0.5578 
(8.77) 
0.5693 
(9.28) 
0.5760 
(9.03) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
st1-ts,
st1-ts,
YY
YY
 ----- ----- 541.37 (7.54) 
478.01 
(5.71) 
State-Specific Effects Interaction Termsb Interaction Termsb Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
R2 0.209 0.273 0.187 0.244 
AIC -8.6396 -8.7789 -8.6122 -8.7399 
SIC -8.3053 -8.3763 -8.2778 -8.3373 
Observations 658 517 658 517 
 
Hypothesis Test:     
State-Specific Interaction 
Termsc 
 
F  = 2.211 
(p-value = 0.000) 
 
F  = 2.356 
(p-value = 0.000) 
 
---- 
 
---- 
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TABLE 1 (Continued ) 
Estimating the Determinants of Changes in the Tax Burden Variable 
Specification  NASBO-3 
(5) 
NCSL-3 
(6) 
NASBO-4 
(7) 
NCSL-4 
(8) 
Constant 0.0020 (2.32) 
0.0029 
(3.61) 
-0.0000 
(0.03) 
0.0003 
(0.60) 
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXESΔ  0.6061 
(9.15) 
0.5747 
(7.68) 
0.6271 
(9.62) 
0.6158 
(7.95) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
st1-ts,
st1-ts,
YY
YY
 ---- ---- 343.47 (3.90) 
327.96 
(3.47) 
State-Specific Effects Interaction Termsb Interaction Termsb Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Time Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effect Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
R2 0.324 0.350 0.314 0.323 
AIC -8.7577 -8.8521 -8.7425 -8.8117 
SIC -8.3347 -8.3673 -8.3195 -8.3269 
Observations 658 517 658 517 
 
Hypothesis Test:     
State-Specific 
Interaction Termsc 
 
F  = 1.592 
(p-value = 0.009) 
 
F  = 2.310 
(p-value = 0.000) 
 
---- 
 
---- 
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NOTES:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients and are based on White period standard errors.  
Hypothesis tests use White’s heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix. 
a  The dependent variable is stBurden ΔTax .  The NASBO-1 and NCSL-1 specifications are based on Equation (11) in the text, with 
Forecast
stTAXESΔ  alternatively being measured by the NASBO- and NCSL-collected state revenue forecasts, respectively.  The other 
specifications represent alternative variants or extensions of these original models. 
b  The “state-specific interaction terms” consist of the 47 terms, ∑
=
×⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − 47
1i
i
sti2
st1-ts,
st1-ts, D
YY
YY
,α , where istD  is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 for state i and 0 otherwise. 
c  The associated null hypothesis is 0H 47222120 ==== ,,,: ααα L . 
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TABLE 2 
Estimating the Importance of Non-Tax Policy Factors as Determinants of Tax Burden 
Approach Description NASBO NCSL 
1a Percent Variance of Burden ΔTax  “Explained” by Non-Tax Policy Factors (No Control Variables) 87.1% 84.1% 
2b 
Percent Variance of Burden ΔTax  “Explained” by Non-Tax Policy Factors 
(With Control Variables,
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ =
st
Forecast
st
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXES
Y
TAXES ΔΔ ββ ˆ ) 84.1% 81.8% 
3c 
Percent Variance of Burden ΔTax  “Explained” by Non-Tax Policy Factors 
(With Control Variables, 1
st
Forecast
st
Y
TAXES
=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δβ ) 56.8% 44.9% 
 
a  This approach consists of a simple regression in which Burden ΔTax  is regressed on. st
Forecast
st YTAXESΔ  The “Percent Variance 
‘Explained’ by Non-Tax Policy Factors” is 2R1−  from this regression. 
b  This approach uses the estimated coefficients from the NASBO-3 and NCSL-3 specifications of TABLE 1 to construct predicted 
values for Burden ΔTax .  The “Percent Variance ‘Explained’ by Non-Tax Policy Factors” equals 1 minus the ratio of the variance in 
these predicted values over the total sample variance of Burden ΔTax . 
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c  This approach is similar to the previous approach, except that NASBO-3 and NCSL-3 specifications are reestimated with the 
restriction that the coefficient on st
Forecast
st YTAXESΔ  equals 1.  These (restricted) coefficient estimates are then used to construct 
predicted values for Burden ΔTax .   
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FIGURE 1 
A Comparison of Three Measures of State Tax Policy Changes: NASBO, NCSL-B, and NCSL-TL 
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NOTES:  The figure plots the annual sum of state tax changes as estimated by the NASBO, NCSL-B and NCSL-TL measures.  
NCSL-B and NCSL-TL refer to NCSL’s “Baseline” and “Tax Liability” measures.  The three measures are described in the 
text.  Fiscal year refers to fiscal year when tax changes are estimated to take effect. 
 36
FIGURE 2 
Tax Burden Versus Changes in State Tax Policy: Iowa 
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NOTES:  The NASBO estimates run through 2002, while the NCSL-B estimates only extend through 1998.  Tax 
Burden measures the ratio of total state tax revenues over total state Personal Income. 
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FIGURE 3 
Tax Burden Versus Changes in State Tax Policy: Louisiana 
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NOTES:  The NASBO estimates run through 2002, while the NCSL-B estimates only extend through 1998.  Tax 
Burden measures the ratio of total state tax revenues over total state Personal Income.  
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FIGURE 4 
Tax Burden Versus Changes in State Tax Policy: Michigan 
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NOTES:  The NASBO estimates run through 2002, while the NCSL-B estimates only extend through 1998.  Tax 
Burden measures the ratio of total state tax revenues over total state Personal Income.  
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FIGURE 5 
Tax Burden Versus Changes in State Tax Policy: United States 
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NOTES:  The NASBO estimates run through 2002, while the NCSL-B estimates only extend through 1998.  Tax Burden 
measures the ratio of total state tax revenues over total state Personal Income 
